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A COMPARISON OF ESTIMATES OF RELATIVE FREQUENCY 
VS. SUBJECTIVE PROBABILITY 
The purpose of this study is to extend the investiga-
tion of the general area of subjective probability by exploring 
three methods of asking for estimates. Inasmuch as this area 
has not been a major focus of interest for experimental 
studies, a brief review of the kinds of studies emanating 
from subjective probability notions will be given. 
Edwards (1954) distinguishes between two uses of the 
phrase "subjective probability." The first, a school of 
thought about the logical basis of mathematical probability 
and the second, a name for a transformation on the scale of 
mathematical probabilities which is somehow related to 
behavior. De Finetti (1937) is considered to have been the 
first to give serious consideration to a formalized theory of 
subjective probability. This publication is substantially 
devoted to a development of subjective probability as the 
basis for, or logical foundation of mathematical probability. 
Savage (1954) follows De Finetti and is also devoted to the 
development of subjective probability as the basis for 
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mathematical probability. Both are formalized approaches to 
the theoretical aspects of subjective probability and deal 
little with empirical studies. 
Subjective probability in the second usage refers to 
an opinion in the form of a measure of personal belief in a 
particular proposition. The proposition concerns the 
occurrence of a certain event, with the degree of belief 
usually expressed as a number or ratio. It is this second 
usage that is the interest of this paper. While subjective 
probability has been a key concept in studies of decision 
theory, little has been done to investigate the behavioral 
implications of such subjective probability concepts. Where 
investigation has been attempted, the methods of obtaining 
estimates have been varied and usually indirect. 
Luce, Bush, and Galanter (1965) attribute the first 
attempt to measure subjective probability experimentally to 
Preston and Baratta (1948). In this study subjects used play 
money to bid for a card on which a probability was written. 
The highest bidder was then allowed a chance to roll a set 
of dice with the probability of winning corresponding 
exactly to the probability printed on the card presented for 
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auction. Subjective probability was computed indirectly as 
demonstrated by the following example. On a given play, 
subjects may have bid for a prize of 250 points with 
probability 0.25 of winning. If the average successful bid 
was 50, then subjective probability was computed to be 50/250 
= 0.20. Using this method of computation it was concluded 
that subjects tend to underestimate when the objective 
probability is greater than 0.20 and systematically over-
estimate when the objective probability is less than 0.20. 
This method has a number of faults. While it is not 
clear whether or not there were restrictions on the bids, it 
is quite possible that restrictions could have existed in a 
variety of forms. It has been hypothesized (Edwards, 1953) 
that subjects tend to have preferences for certain proba-
bilities over others. If this is a valid relationship, then 
it could have suppressed subject's bidding behavior for 
other than preferred probabilities. In other words, this 
could have resulted in self-imposed restrictions on the 
subject's bids. Another possible restriction on the bids 
was the total amount available at any given time for use in 
bidding. It would seem quite likely that subjects with 
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small total amounts with which to bid from would be more 
hesitant to bid than subjects with an abundance with which 
to bid from. Because winning the bid does not necessarily 
mean winning the bet, subjects could have depleted their 
total amount to the point that they may have entered into a 
bidding situation with inadequate amounts with which to bid. 
These types of restrictions on a bid would result in a 
marked confounding of a computed subjective probability. 
Edwards (1961) gives the two approaches most commonly 
used to measure subjective probability as inference from a 
Subjective Expected Utility (SEU) model, the SEU model being 
a model for decision theory, and direct psychophysical judg-
ment methods. In the SEU model subjective probability is 
usually inferred but not without being confounded with the 
concept of utility; utility being the value the occurrence 
of the event has for the individual. Davidson, Suppes, and 
Siegal (1957), in their book on decision theory, devote a 
chapter to a discussion of this method of measuring subjective 
probability. 
Subjects were allowed to choose between two courses 
of action (see Figure 1) • The two states controlled which 
option 1 
option 2 
state 1 
win 15¢ 
lose 8¢ 
state 2 
lose 8¢ 
win 15¢ 
Figure 1. Matrix used by Davidson, et al. (1957) 
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pay off was given and were determined by some random device. 
Various random devices were tried until one was found so 
that the subjects were indifferent about the two options. 
If they were indifferent to the options, then this was felt 
to imply that the subjective probabilities of the two events 
were equal; i.e., equal to 0.50. Having found events with 
equal subjective probabilities (a die on three faces of 
which they had printed the nonsense syllable ZOJ and the 
syllable ZEJ on the other three faces) , they proceeded to 
use these in finding a function representing utility values. 
After finding this function, they then used it and the same 
bets to find the subjective probability of other events. 
Using the utility function to find the subjective 
probability of other events appears to have several serious 
limitations. First, in constructing the equally-spaced 
utility intervals using the subjective probability of 0.50, 
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it is assumed that this subjective probability remains at 
0.50 regardless of what outcomes are paired with it and 
regardless of experience with it (Edwards, 1961). Anything 
that might have caused the subjective probability to change 
from 0.50 would invalidate the constructed utility function 
which, in turn, would have made a derived subjective 
probability based on it invalid. A second limitation is the 
possibility of an interaction between utility and subjective 
probability. Edwards (1961) points to this relationship in 
interpreting the results of measuring subjective probability 
in a utility measurement experiment. 
Subjective probability functions obtained from bets 
on which subjects would only win or break even indicate 
that subjective probability exceeded objective proba-
bility at all points between 0 and 1. But functions 
obtained from bets on which subjects could only lose or 
break even indicate that the subje~tive probability 
equalled objective probability. In other words, there 
was a vigorous ,interaction between the sign of the pay 
off and the shape of the subjective probability function. 
(Edwards, 1961, p. 480.) 
Irwin (1953) suggests that the degree of subjective 
probability and utility, not merely the sign or pay off, 
interact. If this is the case, then any attempt to measure 
subjective probability in the context of the SEU model is 
going to be confounded with the interaction between utility 
or sign and the subjective probability. 
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Luce, et al. (1965) describe another game-like method 
used by Shuford (1959) to obtain measurements of subjective 
probability. This technique was like the one used in the 
Preston and Baratta (1948) study in that it was a bidding 
situation. It differed to the extent that the subjects did 
not bid against each other and the bids were based upon a 
20 x 20 matrix of vertical and horizontal bars. The subjects 
were run in pairs with one subject bidding that a horizontal 
or vertical bar would be selected while the other subject 
decided to buy or sell that bid. The bid was kept between 
0 and 10. The experimenter would randomly select two intergers 
from the intergers 1 to 20 in order to pick a row and column 
of the matrix to enter. Shuford (1959) theorized that the 
bidders best strategy in the game was to set the bid equal to 
ten times his subjective probability of the favorable outcome. 
Shuford transformed the data by dividing the bid by 10. In 
so doing Shuford claimed to obtain a number representing the 
subject's subjective probability. Such results from Shuford's 
subjects confirmed the earlier findings of Preston 
and Baratta in that a large fraction of the subjects over-
estimated low probabilities and underestimated high ones. 
Shuford also found that subjective probability estimates of 
a number of the subjects were fit quite well by a linear 
function of objective probability. 
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This method has some of the limitations of the Preston 
and Baratta (1948) study. Direct limitations are placed on 
the subject's bid; that is, the bid must be from 1 to 10. 
When the upper limit of the bid is 10, the computed subjective 
probability (10/10) could never be greater than 1, a relation-
ship that has been suggested to not necessarily exist 
(Edwards, 1961). 
It is not clear whether the subjects had an unlimited 
amount with which to bid or if this was an initial amount 
which decreased or increased as a result of "playing the game." 
It is possible that bidding and therefore computed subjective 
probability interacts with the total amount available at the 
time of the bid. Another source of confounding was present 
in the form of inter-personal interactions. While the 
bidding situation was not a competitive one, such as in the 
Preston and Baratta study, the subjects were run in pairs 
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with one subject bidding and the other subject buying or 
selling that bid. It is quite possible that the choosing to 
buy or sell another's bid functioned as a reinforcement for 
that other person. This form of social reinforcement in the 
interaction situation might have influenced the size of 
succeeding bids. The transformation of the data by Shuford 
would also seem to be open to criticism. No explanation is 
given as to why the bids were divided by the specific value 
of 10. An obvious explanation would be that this constant 
produced the best approximation of the objective probability, 
a technique that would be highly suspicious. 
Each of the foregoing methods of measuring subjective 
probability has been related to a game or uncertain outcome 
situation. In all of them the measured or computed subjective 
probability has been confounded with; limits of bids, inter-
actions with utility, inter-personal interactions, 
transformations of the data, or some combination of these. 
An alternative approach is that of direct psycho-
physical measurement. Edwards (1961), in referring to direct 
psychophysical judgment methods, describes them as requiring 
subjects to estimate the proportion of one class of elements 
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in a display that has more than one type of element. While 
he describes this technique as the "estimating of propor-
tion," he refers to it as a "direct" method of measuring 
subjective probability as opposed to the "indirect" method 
of inference from an SEU model. Luce, et al. (1965), in 
referring to the same general class of experiments, that is, 
those referred to as psychophysical judgment methods, 
suggest that while they are not explicitly concerned with the 
measurement of subjective probability, they do bear a rather 
close relation to it. This relation is seen as the scale of 
proportion that is based on the responses of subjects to 
randomly composed arrays of two or more types of elements. 
This suggests that subjective probability is based upon the 
same type of information as mathematical probability. That 
is, while mathematical probability is a function of relative 
frequencies or the ratio of the number of units in each 
class to the number of units in the whole population, 
subjective probability is based upon "estimates" of the 
relative frequencies. These direct psychophysical judgment 
methods usually require subjects to estimate the proportion 
of one type of stimulus element of two types. 
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Stevens and Galanter (1957), while investigating 
ratio scales and category scales, had subjects estimate 
percentage of blue and green.dots. Subjects were shown cards 
each containing 36 dots in the two colors. The number of 
dots of one color varied from 3 to 33 in steps of three. 
The subjects were shown the card and then asked to estimate 
percentage of blue or green.dots. Each subject was asked to 
give estimates for each color. The results of this study 
showed the relation between average responses and proportion 
was an inverse ogive. Stevens and Galanter (1957) suggest 
these results indicate subjects are fairly accurate 
estimators of proportion. 
Shuford (1961) felt that subjects in the Stevens 
and Galanter (1957) study may have been able to count the 
dots of the smaller proportion when they number 3 to 6, thus 
producing an inverted ogive curve. When making percentage 
estimates, Shuford felt that subjects could figure that 
3/36 = 1/12 is about 8 per cent and that 33/36 = 1-1/12 
is about 92 per cent. This would give almost no error at 
the extremes; however, there would be a certain amount of 
uncertainty at the middle as subjects would have a difficult 
12 
time counting the larger numbers. This type of relation 
would produce the inverse ogive. Using the same method of 
presenting elements as Shuford (1959), the number of elements 
presented was increased to 400. When using a small propor-
tion of 10 per cent, the relative frequency was 40 and 
Shuford (1961) felt that this relative frequency made it 
impossible to count the elements and arrive at an estimate 
of proportion. The results showed the relation between 
percentage estimate and proportion to be an S-shaped ogive 
rotated slightly about the center of the graph in a clock-
wise direction. This is different from the results of 
Stevens and Galanter (1957) who obtained results yielding an 
inverse ogive. 
Holmberg (1964), in an investigation of the additi-
vity theorem as applied to subjective probability used a 
direct psychophysical technique of obtaining judgments of 
proportion. Subjects viewed a series of slides showing 
various complex objects, such as: airplanes, birds, flowers, 
and ceramics. Following the presentation of the slides, 
subjects were given a questionnaire containing items 
related to several aspects of the slides. On each questionnaire 
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only one of the questions was related to the task of estimat-
ing proportion as a measure of subjective probability. It 
was assumed that by having the question on proportion 
presented with other non-related questions that the task of 
the experiment remained concealed and that subjects did not 
count objects and arrive at estimates on succeeding trials. 
The results of this study were non-significant due to large 
amounts of individual variance. While concealing the task 
from the subjects might have helped prevent them from 
counting, it would also seem to have encouraged subjects to 
guess what the task was going to be. Subjects attempting 
to anticipate the experimenter might have concentrated on 
inappropriate stimulus dimensions producing inaccurate 
estimates not because of inability to judge proportion but 
because of interference from concentrating on characteristics 
other than observed relative frequency. 
A number of techniques of measuring subjective 
probability have been described. Each of these approaches 
has had some limitations in terms of measuring subjective 
probability. In the early studies using game models (Preston 
and Baratta, 1948), subjective probability was inferred from 
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a betting or bidding situation in which subjective 
probability was compounded with restrictions on the bid and 
availability of money to bid with. In the SEU model 
(Davidson, Suppes, Siegal, 1957) measurement of subjective 
probability was compounded with utility. In the technique 
used by Shuford (1959) a subjective probability derived 
from subjects' bids was confounded with social reinforcement 
as well as the apparent arbitrary transformation of the data 
so as to produce results approximating the objective propor-
tions. While direct psychophysical measurement would seem 
to eliminate some of the compounding involved in game or 
uncertain outcome models, there have been limitations with 
the methods used. Direct psychophysical judgments of 
observer proportion is a task claimed to be related to 
estimates of subjective probability. Stevens and Galanter 
(1957) had subjects estimate proportion of dots contained in 
a stimulus field. Shuford (1961) felt that the relative 
frequencies of the smaller proportions in the Stevens and 
Galanter study allowed subjects to count the elements and 
thus arrive at the proportion mathematically. By increasing 
the number of elements to 400 and having subjects estimate 
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proportion, Shuford obtained results somewhat different from 
Stevens and Galanter. Subjects in both these studies were 
asked for estimates of proportion reported as a percentage. 
Holmberg (1964) may have confounded his results by concealing 
the task of estimating proportions. 
While the task of asking for estimates of proportion 
seems to have some promise for investigating subjective 
probability, the relation between observed proportion and 
subjective probability needs to be further understood. 
Shuford (1961) points to the necessity of understanding the 
task of estimating proportions where the same type stimuli 
are to be used for estimating subjective probability. In 
attempting this understanding, Shuford (1961) investigated 
several parameters of asking for percentage estimates. 
Among those studied were element type and length of exposure 
time of the stimuli. 
It may be that there are differences in estimates 
due to the way we ask for those estimates. There have been 
no reports of investigations comparing asking for estimates 
of subjective probability with asking of estimates of 
observed proportion when those estimates were based on the 
identical set of stimuli. 
HYPOTHESES 
If, as Edwards (1961) suggests, "subjective 
probability is linearly related to observed proportion," 
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then estimates of relative frequency should be equal to a 
simple linear function of estimates of subjective probability. 
Inasmuch as this relationship has not been tested, this study 
was designed to test the following hypotheses: 
If estimates of observed proportion, estimates of 
proportion expected in the future, and estimates of 
subjective probability are based upon identical stimuli, 
then there will be no difference in those estimates. 
Subjective probability is defined as an estimate of the 
likelihood of occurrence of a particular event. The specific 
null hypotheses tested were: 
1. Estimates of subjective probability will not 
differ from estimates of observed proportion. 
2. Estimates of subjective probability will not 
differ from estimates of expected long-run proportion. 
3. Estimates of observed proportion will not differ 
from estimates of expected long-run proportion. 
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METHOD 
Ninety subjects (Ss) were given six (6) trials. One 
trial consisted of viewing a set of five (5) slides, each 
slide showed a different 72-unit matrix of three different 
geometric figures. Following each trial, Ss were required 
to give estimates either of observed proportion, expected 
long-run proportion, or subjective probability. On three 
trials, the estimates were based on geometric figures whose 
mathematical proportion was .67 and on three trials estimates 
were based on geometric figures whose mathematical proportion 
was .22. 
Design 
A 3 x 2 randomized group design with repeated measures 
was used. The factors were as follows: 
A. Type of estimate asked for; A1 observed propor-
tion; A2 probability of occurrence of single geometric 
figure; A3 expected long-run proportion. 
B. Order of geometric figures or objective proportion 
which estimates were based upon; B1--square (.22)--
triangle (.67)--triangle (.67) square (.22)--triangle 
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(.67)--square (.22), B2--triangle (.67)--square (.22)--
square (.22)--triangle (.67)--square (.22)--triangle 
(.67). 
c. Trials (repeated measures). (See Table 1.) 
Subjects 
Subjects were 90 undergraduate volunteers attending 
Central Washington State College and were randomly assigned 
to treatment groups. 
Apparatus and Materials 
Six (6) identical sets of slides containing five (5) 
35 mm 2 x 2 slides were used. Each of the five slides 
showed seventy-two (72) geometric figures (triangles, squares, 
and circles of different proportions) arranged in a different 
non-rectangular matrix (see Appendix A). Different non-
rectangular matrices were used in an attempt to prevent Ss 
from determining the total number of geometric figures and 
thus being able to use this as a basis for their estimates. 
The relative frequency and objective proportions for each 
matrix were as follows: circles - 8 - .11, squares - 16 -
.22, and triangles - 48 - .67. The matrices were drawn on 
TABLE I 
3 x 2 RANDOMIZED GROUP DESIGN WITH REPEATED MEASURES 
TRIALS C 
C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 
OBSERVED PROPORTION A1 Bl .22 .67 • 67 .22 • 67 
B2 • 67 .22 .22 • 67 .22 
SUBJECTIVE PROBABILITY A2 Bl .22 • 67 .67 .22 • 67 
B2 • 67 .22 .22 .67 .22 
LONG-RUN PROPORTION A3 Bl .22 .67 • 67 .22 • 67 
B2 • 67 .22 .22 • 67 .22 
(Objective Proportions) 
c6 
.22 
• 67 
.22 
• 67 
.22 
• 67 
I-' 
\r> 
white paper using India ink and then photographed using a 
35mrn camera and "Kodak Pan-X" film. The negative prints 
were then made into 2 x 2 slides producing a light-on-dark 
projected image. 
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Three slides showing the three geometric figures 
individually were used for demonstrating the geometric 
figures at the beginning of the experimental session. All 
slides were projected upon a 5 1 x 5' portable screen using a 
"Kodak Carousel" slide projector. The slides were placed in 
the carousel with two blank spaces between the three separate 
geometric figures and the first set of five matrices, and 
two blank spaces between each of the six (6) sets of five 
(5) slides. This particular model projector, lacking a 
shutter, projected light upon the screen when placed on a 
blank space. This supplied ample lighting for the Ss to 
record estimates at the end of each trial. Ss viewed the 
slides in a 10 1 x 20' room which seated a maximum of nine (9) 
Ss at one time. To one side of the screen was a blackboard 
that E used while giving instructions. Each S was 
provided with pencil, file folder with attached envelope, 
and six answer sheets. The answer sheets were contained in 
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the envelopes and Ss were required to place a completed answer 
sheet in the file folder at the end of each trial. Each 
answer sheet consisted of a slip of paper approximately 
2" x 8 11 with the denominator of 100 shown ( /100). 
Procedure 
The study was run on two successive days with Ss run 
in groups that varied in number from 3 to 9. Ss were held 
in a waiting room prior to the actual running of each group. 
Each group was randomly assigned a treatment with the excep-
tion that the final Ss were assigned treatments so as to 
equate the N of each group. E would enter the waiting room 
and lead Ss to the experimental room where they were requested 
to pick up the file folders and pencils from their seats 
before being seated. As Ss entered the experimental room, 
they were instructed to refrain from talking until the end 
of the experimental session. 
After Ss were seated, E remained at the rear of the 
room beside the slide projector and read the following set 
of general instructions. 
"Please hold the file folder and pencil in your lap, 
do not write anything. The experiment that you are about 
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to participate in is being conducted by the Department 
of Psychology as a part of a larger investigation of the 
area of decision theory. Generally, you will view some 
sets of slides projected upon the screen before you. 
Each set will contain a number of slides showing geo-
metric figures such as these. (At this time, E projected 
the three separate slides showing the geometric figures.)" 
In reviewing investigations of relative frequency and 
subjective probability, a problem common to both was evident. 
This problem centered on the amount of individual and within-
group variance among estimates. Luce, et al. (1965) in 
summarizing the findings of Shuford (1959) report that some 
Ss' estimates of subjective probability were well fit by a 
linear function of objective probability, although the slope 
and intercept of this function varied from one subject to 
another. Coombs and Beardslee (1954) point to this type of 
variance in mentioning some unpublished analysis of data for 
individual subjects of Edwards (1953) • Coombs and Beardslee 
(1954) suggest that grouping of data in studies of subjective 
probability may mask large individual differences. Crawford 
(1963), in investigating subjects' ability to make theoretical 
long-run estimates of frequency had considerable within-group 
variance, although not enough to prevent attaining significant 
difference between groups. Holmberg (1964), in an investigation 
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of the additivity theorem as applied to subjective probability 
had subjects view different classes of objects and then asked 
for estimates of complimentary subjective probabilities. 
Individual variance was large enough to prevent attaining 
significant differences. 
It was thought by this experimenter that individual 
variance in estimates could be caused by Ss lack of understand-
ing concerning the concept of probability. In an attempt to 
control for this suspected cause of variance while running a 
follow-up study to the study run by Holmberg (1964) , the 
following procedure was used. Ss were given a short definition 
of probability followed by an example prior to being asked 
for estimates of subjective probability. There still was a 
large amount of individual variance among estimates and lack 
of understanding concerning the concept of probability still 
seemed a possibility. In an attempt to control for this 
source of variance in the present study, E gave three differ-
ent sets of instructions related to the estimates asked for. 
Groups received the instructions on the basis of factor A, 
type of estimate asked for. The instructions were matched 
in terms of length, wording, and examples used (see Appendix B). 
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The instructions related to estimates asked for were 
given once to each group and followed the general instructions. 
E went to the blackboard beside the 5' x 5' screen and used it 
to graphically show the numerical examples in the instruc-
tions. All examples were erased at the conclusion of the 
instructions. E then returned to the back of the room beside 
the projector and read the following set of instructions: 
"Please observe carefully the following set of slides, but 
make no notations." The first set of five (5) slides was then 
shown. Each slide was shown for two seconds with one second 
between each slide. Following the first set of five (5) 
slides, E asked for an estimate. This procedure of asking 
Ss to observe the slides, showing a set of five (5) slides, 
and asking for an estimate was repeated five more times for 
each group. 
The estimate asked for on each trial was determined 
by the treatment group. On three of these trials Ss esti-
mates were based upon triangles whose objective proportion 
was .67 and on the other three trials the estimates were 
based upon squares whose objective proportion was .22. To 
control for any order effect that might have resulted from 
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using two different objective proportions as bases for 
estimates two different orders of objective proportions were 
used (see Table I). One order was the mirror image of the 
other. The forms of the questions used to elicit the esti-
mates can be found in Appendix c. 
At the conclusion of the experimental session, Ss 
were thanked for their participation and asked to refrain 
from discussing the experiment until the conclusion of the 
series. At this time, Ss were led from the experimental room 
back to the waiting room. 
RESULTS 
Estimates for all conditions were converted to 
absolute error scores to make the estimates based on different 
objective proportions comparable. Absolute error scores 
are defined thus as the absolute deviation or error of an 
estimate from the objective proportion that the estimate was 
based upon. By using 11 absolute 11 error scores, some of the 
artifacts of averaging were eliminated. An analysis of 
variance as so described by Edwards (1964) was used to analyze 
the data. A summary of the Analysis of Variance for the 
26 
absolute error scores is shown in Table 2. Three values of 
F are significant, treatment and order x trials are 
significant beyond the .01 level, while order is significant 
beyond the .OS level. 
The treatment effect A, type of estimate asked for, 
yielded an F of 6.10 which for 2 and 84 degrees of freedom 
is significant beyond the .01 level. Treatment effect A 
was partitioned into its three levels and t-tests of the 
difference between means computed. The mean error for 
estimates of subjective probability (level 2 of factor A) 
was 19.68. This mean was significantly greater than the 
means of the other two levels of factor A, estimates of 
observed proportion (15.13) and estimates of long-run 
proportion (14.63). The mean difference between estimates 
of observed proportion and subjective probability was 4.55 
giving a t of 3.074 which is significant beyond the .01 
level for 358 degrees of freedom. The mean difference 
between estimates of subjective probability and estimates 
of long-run proportion was 5.05 giving a t of 3.322 which 
is significant beyond the .01 level for 358 degrees of 
freedom. The mean difference between estimates of observed 
SOURCE OF VARIATION 
A: Estimate Type 
B: Order 
AXB: Estimate X Order 
Error (a) 
C: Trials 
AXC: Estimate X Trials 
#BXc: Order X Trials 
AXBXC: Estimate X Order X 
Trials 
Error (b) 
TOTAL 
* p < .01 
** p < .05 
# 
See Table 3 
TABLE II 
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE 
SUM OF 
SQUARES d.f. 
2,780.9 2 
1,185.19 1 
645.87 2 
19,118.52 84 
592.35 5 
1,946.97 10 
9,218.88 5 
1, 082. 79 10 
66,369.35 420 
102,940.82 539 
MEAN 
SQUARE 
1390.45 
1185.19 
322.93 
227.6 
118.47 
194.70 
1843.78 
108.28 
158.02 
F 
6.100** 
5.201* 
1.418 
0.749 
1.232 
11. 668** 
0.685 
N 
-.J 
TABLE III 
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR PROPORTION PULLED FROM 
ORDER X TRIALS INTERACTION 
SOURCE OF VARIATION 
Proportion 
Proportion X Trials 
Error (b) 
** p < .01 
* p < .05 
SUM OF 
SQUARES 
8,639.99 
1,764.08 
66,369.35 
d.f. 
1 
5 
420 
MEAN 
SQUARE 
8,639.99 
352.82 
158.02 
F 
61.004** 
2.233* 
!\.) 
00 
TYPE OF 
ESTIMATE 
Al 
A2 
A3 
TABLE IV 
MEANS FOR RAW SCORES AND ABSOLUTE ERROR 
SCORES BY OBJECTIVE PROPORTION 
OBJECTIVE DEVIATION 
PROPORTION RAW SCORE FROM OBJECTIVE 
BASED ON MEAN PROPORTION 
.22 31. 20 + 9.20 
• 67 53.24 -13.76 
.22 31. 37 + 9.37 
. 67 52.37 -14.78 
. 22 27.36 + 5.39 
• 67 56.36 -10.64 
ABSOLUTE ERROR 
SCORE MEAN 
11. 51 
18.76 
14.87 
24.49 
11.07 
18.20 
N 
\0 
proportion and estimates of long-run proportion was .5 
giving a t of .362 which is non-significant. 
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On the basis of the significant differences obtained 
above, the null hypothesis is rejected for estimates of 
subjective probability vs. estimates of observed proportion 
and estimates of subjective probability vs. estimates of 
expected long-run proportion. The null hypothesis is 
supported by a non-significant difference in the case of 
estimates of observed proportion vs. estimates of expected 
long-run proportion. 
The main effect B, order of objective proportion 
estimates were based upon, yielded an F of 5.207 which for 
1 and 420 degrees of freedom is significant beyond the .05 
level. This significance shows that the mean error of 17.96 
for estimates based upon the order square - triangle -
triangle - square - triangle - square (c 2), is significantly 
larger than the mean error of 15.00 for estimates based on 
the order, triangle - square - square - triangle - square -
triangle (c1). The trial effect C failed to yield a 
significant F, F = 0.749 indicating that while there was a 
trend for the errors to decrease there was no significant 
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difference between the trial mean errors (see Figure 2). 
The interaction BXC, order x trials yielded an F of 
11.668, which for 5 and 420 degrees of freedom is significant 
beyond the .01 level. Contained within this order x trials 
interaction is the effect due to the objective proportion 
that the estimates were based upon. This effect was pulled 
out and is shown in Table 3. The effect due to objective 
proportion yielded an F of 61.004 which for 1 and 420 
degrees of freedom is significant beyond the .01 level. The 
interaction, objective proportion x trials, yielded an F of 
2.233 which for 5 and 420 degrees of freedom is significant 
beyond the .05 level. The significance for objective 
proportion shows that the mean error of 20.48 for estimates 
based upon triangles (objective proportion of .67) is 
significantly larger than the mean error of 12.48 for esti-
mates based upon squares (objective proportion of .22). 
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Figure 2. Means, averaged over levels of order and proportion 
for each of 6 trials. 
DISCUSSION 
The results of this study fail to reject the null 
hypothesis in one case and force rejection in two cases. A 
significant difference in mean error scores was found between 
estimates of observed proportion and estimates of subjective 
probability. This difference indicates that when using a 
direct psychophysical method, asking for an estimate of 
proportion is not the same as asking for an estimate of 
probability of occurrence. The significant difference between 
mean error scores of estimates of expected long-run proportion 
and mean error scores of estimates of probability of 
occurrence suggests that these are also different tasks. The 
non-significant difference between estimates of observed 
proportion and estimates of expected long-run proportion 
suggests that they are similar tasks. That is, asking a 
person to project an estimate into the future does not 
interfere with that estimate. 
In several investigations of subjective probability, 
Edwards (1961) and Luce, et al. (1965), the investigators 
substituted estimates of observed proportion for estimates 
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of subjective probability. This suggests that these experi-
menters believed these two tasks to be the same. It was felt 
by this investigator that the type of estimate asked for 
might produce different estimates. This study was designed 
to compare estimates of subjective probability with estimates 
of observed proportion when those estimates were based upon 
the same stimuli. It was hypothesized that asking for 
estimates of subjective probability would yield results 
similar to asking for estimates of observed proportion. The 
results of this investigation show that the methods used in 
it to obtain estimates do differ. When asked to estimate 
subjective probability Ss made significantly greater errors 
than when asked to make estimates of observed proportion or 
expected long-run proportion. 
There are several possible explanations for these 
results. First, estimates of subjective probability may not 
be simple functions of estimates of observed proportion. It 
seems quite possible that while mathematical probability is 
a direct function of relative frequency or proportion, 
subjective probability may not be a simple function of 
observed proportion. Those investigations of the applicability 
of the additivity theorm to subjective probability 
(Holmberg, 1964) would seem to support this position. An 
additional analysis of the data from both raw scores and 
error scores points to further considerations. When 
comparing mean raw scores for each of the estimates it 
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appears that all methods of asking for estimates produce 
similar results (see Table 4). For each type of estimate Ss 
underestimated the higher objective proportion (.67) and 
overestimated the lower objective proportion (.22). These 
results are in agreement with Preston and Baratta (1948) and 
Shuford (1959). It would appear that while Ss are not 
particularly accurate estimaters of these objective proportions 
they do give similar estimates when asked to estimate 
subjective probability based upon the same stimuli. That is, 
the results are similar regardless of type of estimate asked 
for. 
However, when estimates are converted into absolute 
error scores the results differ. The results of this study 
show that when measured in error scores there is significantly 
greater amount of error for estimates of subjective 
probability than for estimates of observed proportion or 
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estimates of expected long-run proportion. This suggests 
that comparing mean raw scores masks some real differences in 
estimates. This greater amount of error or variability in 
estimates of subjective probability could indicate that 
asking for estimate of subjective probability is a somewhat 
different task than asking for estimates of either observed 
proportion or expected long-run proportion. 
Although the possibility remains that the differences 
between estimates is due to basic differences in the tasks 
involved, a second possibility exists. While an attempt was 
made to balance the instructions and the way estimates were 
asked for, it remains quite possible that certain key 
terminology was not equal for all treatments. In comparing 
the instructions for estimates of expected long-run propor-
tion and for estimates of observed proportion the key 
terminology is "proportion." On the other hand, in reviewing 
the instructions for estimates of subjective probability, the 
key terminology is "probability." It may be that the tasks 
are the same, but that this difference in basic terminology 
caused the significant differences in estimates. It was 
assumed that following the elaborate instructions concerning 
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probability, proportion, and expected long-run proportion 
that Ss could handle the concepts of proportion and probability. 
It seems reasonable to believe that probability is not a 
simple nor necessarily a familiar concept and may in fact 
seriously interfere with the measurement of subjective 
probability when asking for direct estimates. 
There is the possibility that Ss are accurate in 
estimating subjective probability but that asking for a 
direct report of that estimate may compound the measure of 
subjective probability. This seems to be a worthy basis for 
suggesting that further studies be conducted investigating 
different methods of asking for estimates of subjective 
probability including indirect as well as direct psycho-
physical techniques. 
In light of the significant differences between 
estimates found in this study, a number of considerations 
for future studies are suggested: 
1. Estimates of relative frequency will not 
substitute for estimates of subjective probability 
where direct psychophysical judgment methods are used. 
2. Future studies need to be centered around 
investigating different methods of asking for direct 
estimates of subjective probability. 
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3. Consideration needs to be given to the idea that 
subjective probability and mathematical probability, 
while similar in appearance, may in fact be very 
different constructs. 
While this study was designed to specifically inves-
tigate the relationship between types of estimates asked for, 
a number of other relationships were included both as controls 
and as a matter of interest. Ss were asked to give estimates 
based upon two different objective proportions. The results 
indicate that when Ss were asked to give estimates based 
upon an objective proportion of .67 they made significantly 
more errors than when estimates were based upon an objective 
proportion of .22. This objective proportion of .22 
corresponded to a relative frequency of 16. Because each 
of the five (5) slides in each trial represented a different 
matrix, and the units of each matrix were randomized separately, 
it is assumed that Ss were unable to count and arrive at a 
relative frequency of 16. It is very possible that 
estimating a relative frequency of 16 is a much easier task 
than estimating a relative frequency of 48 when those two 
relative frequencies are not complimentary. 
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A possible explanation for this significant difference 
is found in a discussion of the results of another experiment 
(Shuford, 1961). The possibility was raised that perception 
of proportions has some of the characteristics of a sampling 
process. The results showed that the average variance of 
subjects increased as the proportion approached 50 per cent. 
A curve that represented the average variance vs. proportion 
was bimodal somewhere between 30 per cent and 40 per cent 
and between 60 per cent and 70 per cent, dropping somewhat 
at 50 per cent. Shuford (1961) suggests that this may 
indicate subjects base their estimates on a sample of 
elements in the matrix and further that subjects might tend 
to fixate on areas composed of clusters of elements. When 
objective proportions are at the ends of the scale fixating 
on clusters would lead subjects to closer estimates of 
proportions because at these proportions there is a greater 
chance of clustering and thus a cluster would more than 
likely be representative. When estimating proportions on 
either side of 50 per cent fixating on clusters would cause 
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an increase in variance among estimates and would show up as 
a bimodal curve. Since an objective proportion of .22 is 
closer to the end of the scale than one of .67, this would 
seem to be a plausible explanation for the significant 
difference between these two objective proportions. 
The significantly greater mean error for estimates 
based upon the sequence .67, .22, .22, .67, .22, 67 vs. the 
mean error for estimates based upon the sequence • 22, .67, 
.67, .22, .67, .22 is perhaps the most surprising result. 
A possible explanation is based upon the previous discussion. 
If we assume that the task of making an estimate based upon 
a proportion close to the end of a scale is an easier task 
than that of making an estimate based upon a proportion near 
the center of that scale, then, the possibility exists that 
the initial trial (first estimate) may produce a set that 
lasts the duration of the sequence of estimates. Having an 
easier task to begin with may make subsequent tasks relatively 
easier, while having a hard task first may make subsequent 
tasks relatively harder. This type of relationship would 
result in greater errors for orders beginning with the target 
objective proportion of .67. 
C\rVSC Lih;:·ary, L:en.::burg, \rVash. 
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SUMMARY 
The purpose of this study was to extend the 
investigation of subjective probability by exploring three 
methods of asking for estimates. The study included an 
examination of two methods of asking for estimates of 
subjective probability and one method of asking for estimates 
of relative frequency. The study utilized 90 college students 
viewing projected matrices, each matrix contained 72 stimulus 
elements made up of 48 triangles, 16 squares, and 8 circles. 
Six trials were given, on three Ss were asked to give an 
estimate based upon triangles and on three Ss were asked to 
give an estimate related to squares. An analysis of variance 
of the data in a randomized group design with repeat measures 
yielded two significant Fs for main effects and one signif i-
cant F for an interaction. 
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APPENDIX A 
ONE OF FIVE DIFFERENCE MATRICES USED AS STIMULI 
!!l 0 ~ /j, 
0 /:),, 6 0 6 
h. fl 0 0 fl. 0 ~ 
~ ~ D A 0 fl 0 
A l:l D. ~ 0 /!:,. D ~ 0 
A A a 0 n A ~ Ll A 
0 A ~ 0 ~ 0 ~ L\ 
l:l.. 6. 0 fl 0 A 
0 Cl 0 fl 0 Dt. 
6 fl 0 A 
APPENDIX B 
Instructions for each group based upon factor A, 
type of estimate asked for: 
A1--0bserved proportion. 
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The task you are about to perform deals with the 
concept of proportion. When we speak of proportion we are 
referring to the mathematical relationship between events, 
objects, or things as determined by their relative number. 
In this way a proportion may be used to express the mathe-
matical relationship between the members of a sub-class or 
sub-group and a larger class or group containing that sub-
group. For example, if we had 100 things in a group and 
these were divided into four sub-groups containing 12, 35, 
50, and 3 elements, then the relationship between each of 
these sub-groups and the total group could be expressed as 
a proportion. The most common way to express proportion is 
as a fraction. In the example given the proportions would 
be 12/100, 35/100, 50/100, and 3/100. When the proportion 
is small the numerator is much smaller than the denominator 
and when the proportion is large the numerator is almost as 
large as the denominator. 
A2--Probability of Occurrence of Next Event 
The task that you are about to perform deals with the 
concept of probability. When we speak of probability we are 
referring to the mathematical relationship between events, 
objects, or things as determined by what we think is the 
relative likelihood of their occurrence. In this way a 
probability may be used to express the mathematical relation-
ship between the likelihood of occurrence of members of one 
class and members of other classes. For example, if we 
expected a group to have 100 things in it and expected that 
group to be divided into four different sub-groups containing 
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12, 35, 50, and 3 elements, then the relationships between 
the likelihood of occurrence of a member of one sub-group 
as compared to the likelihood of occurrence of a member of 
members of other groups could be expressed as a probability. 
The most common way to express probability is as a fraction. 
In the example given the probabilities would be 12/100, 35/100, 
50/100, and 3/100. When the probability is small, the numera-
tor is much smaller than the denominator and when the probab~lity 
is large the numerator is almost as large as the denominator. 
A3--Expected Long Run Proportion 
The task that you are about to perform deals with 
the concept of expected proportion. When we speak of expected 
proportion we are referring to the mathematical relationship 
between events, objects, or things as determined by what we 
think the relative number of each will be. In this way, an 
expected proportion may be used to express the mathematical 
relationship between the members of a sub-class or sub-group 
and a larger group or class containing that sub-group. For 
example, if we expected a group to have 100 elements in it, 
and we expected that group to be divided into four sub-groups, 
containing 12, 35, 50, and 3 elements, then the relationship 
between each of these sub-groups and the total group could 
be expressed as an expected proportion. The most common way 
to express expected proportion is as a fraction. In the 
example given the expected proportions would be 12/100, 35/100, 
50/100, and 3/100. When the expected proportion is small, 
the numerator is much smaller than the denominator and when 
the expected proportion is large the numerator is almost as 
large as the denominator. 
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APPENDIX C 
Method of asking for estimates: 
A1 (B1 and B ) Observed proportion for objective proportions 
of .22 and -~7-
Considering the sets of geometric figures you have just seen, 
what proportion of them were squares (.22)? ••.•• were 
triangles (.67)? 
A2 (B1 and B2) Probability of Occurrence of Next Event Based 
upon objective proportions of .22 and .67. 
If I were to show a single geometric figure to you, based 
on the slides you have just seen, what would you expect the 
probability to be that the next slide shown would be a square 
(.22)? ..••• a triangle (.67)? 
A3 (B1 and B2) Expected Long Run Proportion for objective 
proportions of .22 and .67. 
If I were to continue to show this set of slidfts to you, 
what in the long run would you expect the proportion of 
squares (.22) to be? ••••• of triangles (.67) to be? 
